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Dodd: The Secession Movement in Florida, 1850-1861, Part II

THE SECESSION MOVEMENT IN
FLORIDA, 1850-1861
By DOROTHY DODD

PART II
ROM the very inception of the Republican party
Florida radicals had watched its progress with
alarm. In his message to the legislature, November
14, 1854, Governor Broome had recounted the
grievances of the South, not the least of which was
the existence in non-slaveholding states of “fanatical organizations ” that had elected a House of Representatives “purely and wickedly sectional in its
character’’ on a platform of restoration of the Missouri Compromise line, repeal of the Fugitive Slave
act, and admission of no more slave states into the
Union. “In view of all this,” he had said, “the
South is calm and unmoved. She is prepared to
abide by the Union, made by the Constitution, with
equal rights under it. Beyond this, she will be
forced to act upon the sentiment, ‘A union of the
South for the protection of the South.’“ 54 The possibility of Fremont’s election in 1856 had been the
occasion for threats of secession. Broome had seen
in his defeat only a respite from Republican ascendancy. The South “should let fanaticism know that
she. has made her last submission to unconstitutional exactions,” he had told the legislature in his
message of November 24. “Her watchword should
be read of all men, ‘Equality in the Union, or independence out of it.’“ 55 And now, in his message of
November 22, 1858, Governor Perry, in view of “the
54
55

Florida House Journal, 1854, 29-30.
Ibid., 1856, 36.
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largely increasing strength and influence of the
abolition element,” recommended a thorough reorganization of the state militia. “He would be a
false sentinel,” Perry said, “who, under the present
aspect of affairs, would cry peace.“ 56 Perry repeated this recommendation the next year, and excitement incident to the John Brown raid secured passage of a measure such as he desired.
Indeed, the John Brown episode and publication
of Helper’s Impeding Crisis of the South with the
sanction of northern congressmen gave new force
to enunciation of political doctrines that had been
common enough during the last ten years. Governor Perry had also recommended in his 1859 message that Florida declare herself unmistakably in
favor of withdrawal from the Union in the contingency of Republican success in the approaching
57
Acting upon this advice, the
presidential election.
legislature adopted resolutions authorizing the governor, in the event of the election of a Republican
president, to cooperate with any or all of the slaveholding states for the maintenance of their rights,
and to convene the legislature in extraordinary session, should the necessity occur. 58 Opposition to
these resolutions was so weak as to have been negligible.
During the spring of 1860 reorganization of the
militia vied with politics for space in Florida papers.
Volunteer companies were organized, young ladies
presented them with flags sewed by their own fair
hands, and elections of militia officers were held in
every community. At the same time county meetings passed resolutions condemning, explicitly or
implicitly, Stephen A. Douglas and his squatter
56
57
58

Ibid., 1858, 27.
Florida Senate Journal, 1859, 35-36.
Ibid., 115.
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sovereignty “heresy.” There is reason to believe
that Douglas had been the choice of the state until
his Freeport debate with Lincoln, but now, of the
entire Florida press, only the Jacksonville Republican favored his nomination. 59 The Democratic convention which met in Tallahassee, April 9, to appoint
delegates to the Charleston convention adopted
resolutions condemning the Douglas doctrine of
slavery in the territories, but expressed no preference for candidates. 60 When the Florida delegation
withdrew from the convention, the action met with
general approbation at home. Indeed, some radicals
hailed the split in the party as the signal for immediate secession. A Democratic meeting in Nassau
county, presided over by former Governor Broome,
unanimously called upon the state convention to
send delegates to the Richmond convention, “unless
indeed it should be deemed advisable for the State
of Florida, immediately to dissolve her connection
with the present confederacy, without waiting for
the action of her sister States of the South.“ 61 And
the editor of the Fernandina East Floridian, seeing
dismemberment of the Union as only a matter of
time, believed that “the South is as well prepared
for that grave issue now, 62 as she will be one or ten
years hence.” One fire-eater advertised for recruits
for a cavalry company whose services would be
offered to the first southern state to secede from “a
Union which exists only in name,” while the Sumter
county grand jury declared in its presentment that
the questions of social progress which underlay the
political strife between North and South would have
59

Fernandina East Floridian, Feb. 16, l860.
Tallahassee Floridian, April 14, l860. Delegates to the convention were T. J. Eppes, B. F. Wardlaw, John Milton, C. E. Dyke,
James B. Owens and G. L. Bowne,
61
Fernandina East Floridian, May 10, 1860.
62
May 10, 1860.
60
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to be solved by war, for “where logic is powerless,
the dominion of lead begins.“
Only one or two persons publicly expressed disapproval of the action at Charleston. E. C. Cabell
wrote from St. Louis, Missouri, whither he and his
family had removed early in 1860, that the Florida
delegates were wrong in seceding and that others
should be appointed to represent Florida in the
Baltimore convention. He declared that disruption
of the Democratic party was mainly the work of
politicians desiring to promote their own ends, and
that if the break were persisted in it would certainly
defeat the Democratic nominee and insure election
of the Black Republican candidate. 64 According to
his son, C. W. Yulee, David L. Yulee also was opposed to withdrawal of southern delegations from
the convention. The Florida senator had long been
a, friend, personally and politically, of Douglas, and
had come to feel that the West would never join with
the East in aggressive abolition legislation. 65 He
publicly advised against sending a delegation to the
Richmond convention because a purely Southern
party convention would only weaken the South, and
against sending one to Baltimore because, having
once left the convention, Florida delegates could not
with dignity return. He would, however, support the
nominee of the Baltimore convention, if nominated
by a two-thirds vote, because he did not think it advisable to dissolve the Democratic party. 66 Yulee
seems to have supported Douglas until after the
63

Ibid., May 17, 1860.
Cabell to Joseph Clisby, May 18, 1860. Tallahassee Floridian,
June 9, 1860. Cabell seems to have become a Democrat, for he
supported Douglas in Missouri.
65
C. Wickliffe Yulee, “Senator Yulee,” in Florida Historical Society Quarterly, II, No. 1, 38.
66
Yulee to C. E. Dyke, May 26, 1860. Tallahassee Floridian,
June 9, 1860.
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latter’s Norfolk speech in which he denied the right
of secession. The Floridian then supported Breckinridge as the only candidate who declared his recognition of that right. 67
In spite of Yulee’s protest, the Democratic state
convention, which met in Quincy, June 4, took the
radical position and appointed delegates to the Richmond convention. John Milton, of Jackson county,
was nominated for governor and R. B. Hilton, of
Leon county, for congressman. Milton, a member of
the seceding Charleston, delegation, had long been a
wheelhorse of the state’s Democracy. He had campaigned vigorously as a Cass elector in 1848, when
on every stump he had stoutly misinterpreted Cass’
famous Nicholson letter, which contained the germ
of the doctrine of popular sovereignty against which
he was to revolt twelve years later. Hilton was a
lawyer who for several years in the early fifties had
been co-editor with Charles E. Dyke of the Tallahassee Floridian and who had opposed “submission” to the Compromise in 1850.
The threat to the Union implicit in the national
political situation gave Florida old-line Whigs and
Americans common ground with conservatives all
over the country, and they rallied to support the
Constitutional Union party. Several West Florida
counties appointed delegates to the convention which
met in Baltimore May 9, and twenty-two counties
were represented in the state convention at Quincy,
June 27, over which former Governor Thomas
Brown presided. The Quincy convention adopted
resolutions endorsing Bell and Everett and declaring
that extreme measures should be resorted to only
if the Supreme Court should uphold the constitutionality of any future anti-slavery legislation by
67
Yulee to W. H. Babcock, Oct. 18, 1860. National Intelligencer,
Nov. 6, 1860.
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.

Congress.
Colonel Edward Hopkins, of Duval
county, was nominated for governor and B. F. Allen,
of Leon county, editor of the Tallahassee Sentinel,
for congressman. 68
Constitutional Union men declared that disunion
was the issue of the campaign. Some Democratic
papers sought to laugh off the charge of disunionism
while others, less politic or more bold, declared that
if Breckinridge were defeated by Lincoln they would
advocate “with all the force God has given us the
immediate formation of a separate confederacy of
the cotton States.“ 69 Several prominent Democrats
declared that they would not hold office under a
Black Republican. Allen, knowing such a course
could only lead to disruption of the Union, when
asked if Florida men should accept office under Lincoln, replied that election of the Republican would
not be sufficient cause to dissolve the Union. 70 The
election gave Milton a majority of 1,742, four times
that of Perry over his Know-Nothing opponent in
1856, while Hilton’s majority was 1,550. This result
was interpreted by Governor Perry as conclusive
evidence of Florida’s readiness to secede should
Lincoln be elected. Governor William H. Gist, of
South Carolina, approached him and other southern
governors on the subject early in October with the
design of arranging for concerted action on the part
of the South. Perry replied that Florida would follow the lead of any single cotton state which might
secede. 71
68

Ibid., July 11, 1860.
St. Augustine Examiner, Oct. 13, 1860, quoted in N. Y. Herald,
Oct. 24, 1860.
70
Fernandina East Floridian, Sept. 20, 1860.
71
Both letters are in John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham
Lincoln: a History, II, 306, 313.
69
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The presidential campaign called out a record poll
in Florida; 2,000 more votes were east in November
than had been in October or in any previous election. Though the state press was overwhelmingly
Democratic, 72 Bell and Everett ran well. It was
said that they received the votes of most of the Douglas Democrats. 73 Certainly Douglas polled only 376
votes. The Breckinridge vote was 8,543, as against
5,437 for Bell, or a majority of 1,369 over Bell and
Douglas combined. Three-fourths of the extraordinary vote proved to have been east for Breckinridge. It cannot be asserted, however, that every
vote for Breckinridge was a vote for secession,
though it seems safe to assume that a vote for Bell
or Douglas was a vote for the Union under the Constitution. Of twenty-nine counties which gave
Breckinridge a majority, six sent firm cooperationist
delegations to the secession convention and three
sent delegations which wavered between cooperation
and immediate secession. The nineteenth senatorial
district, containing four counties which together
gave a large Breckinridge majority, also sent a
cooperationist delegate to the convention.
Reaction to the election was immediate. Public
meetings were held in county after county and resolutions were adopted declaring that the election of
Lincoln ought not to be submitted to, calling on all
federal officers to resign, and recommending that a
72
The Quincy Republic classified the press as follows: For
Breckinridge and Lane : Pensacola Tribune, Marianna Patriot,
Apalachicola Times, Quincy Republic, Tallahassee Floridian, Monticello Family Friend, Madison Messenger, Newnansville Dispatch,
Ocala Home Companion, Lake City Herald, Jacksonville Standard,
Cedar Keys Telegraph, Fernandina East Floridian, Tampa Peninsular, St. Augustine Examiner, Key West Key of the Gulf. For
Bell and Everett: Pensacola Gazette, Milton Courier, Marianna
Enterprise, Tallahassee Sentinel, Lake City Press. For Douglas
and Johnson (doubtful) : Jacksonville Mirror. Fernandina East
Floridian, July 26, 1860.
73
N. Y. Herald, Nov. 5, 1860.
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convention be called to take Florida out of the Union
immediately. At a meeting held at Madison Courthouse, November 12, recruits were sought for a company of minute men and eighty-three men signed up.
The company was organized and officers elected before the meeting adjourned. 74 Citizens meeting at
Waldo, November 8, had pledged themselves “boldly
to march to the assistance of the first State that may
secede” and, in token of their sincerity, had resolved
on the next day to burn Abe Lincoln in effigy. 75 Governor Perry declared for immediate and separate
state action, as did Governor-elect Milton and Congressman-elect Hilton. The Democratic press almost
unanimously urged immediate secession and called
upon Perry to convene the legislature, as authorized
by the resolutions of the previous year. There was
little to be gained by such action, however, for the
legislature was to convene in regular session in the
last week of November.
Awaiting the legislature, when it did convene, was
a letter from Yulee in which he declared that, upon
the secession of Florida at any time before the expiration of his term, March 4, 1861, he would
“promptly and joyously” return home to support
the state to which his allegiance was due. 76 Until the
writing of this letter Yulee’s action had been conservative. Only a month earlier he had written that
it was “most desirable” to preserve the Union, even
with much sacrifice ; he hoped that this could be done
by new guarantees of southern rights in the form of
constitutional amendments. 77 During the period of
his involuntary retirement from the Senate he had
74
75

Tallahassee Floridian, Nov. 24, 1860.
Ibid.
76
Fla. Senate Journ., 1860, 16.
77
Yulee to W. H. Babcock, Oct. 18, 1860. National Intelligencer,
Nov. 6, 1860.
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become interested in a plan for building a railroad
across the Florida peninsula. This had been done
by 1860 and Yulee was president of the road, which
ran from Fernandina to Cedar Keys. C. W. Yulee
suggests that his father’s economic interests made
him averse to secession. 78 To this it might be replied, as the New York Times charged, that the
“railroad class” wanted secession for financial reasons, hoping thereby to slough off a heavy bonded
indebtedness to northern capitalists. 79 Neither position is susceptible of proof with the evidence at
hand. Yulee wrote after the war, under conditions
not conducive to absolute candor, that he neither
advised nor stimulated secession, though he approved the act as a social and political necessity
after he had despaired of a solution through action
of a constitutional convention. 80 This statement is
confirmed by S. S. Cox, who says that “the Senators
from Florida were never regarded, however they
seemed, as favorable to the secession movement,”
and that neither Mallory nor Yulee “exerted any
considerable influence at Washington in the direction
of disunion during the winter of 1860-‘61.“ 81 Yet
Yulee’s letter, though perfectly consistent with his
long-held belief in state sovereignty and his conception of a senator as the ambassador of a sovereign state, was tantamount at that time to an entirely
gratuitous blessing on the secession movement.
The legislature did not need encouragement from
Yulee. Governor Perry’s entire message was de78

Fla. Hist. Soc. Quart., II, No. 1, 37.
Cited in W. W. Davis, “The Civil War and Reconstruction in
Florida,” Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and
Public
Law, LIII, 66.
80
Yulee’s application for amnesty to Andrew Johnson, June 24,
1865. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series II, Vol.
VIII, 669-70. (Cited hereafter as 0. R.)
81
S. S. Cox, Three Decades of Federal Legislation, 72.
79
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voted to an argument for immediate secession. To
await some overt act of unconstitutional power on
the part of the North, he said, was only to court the
fate of Santo Domingo. 82 A bill calling a constitutional convention to meet January 3 in Tallahassee
was introduced simultaneously in both houses. It
was rushed through without an adverse vote and
signed by Governor Perry on November 30, the
fourth day of the session. Sentiment in favor of
secession was not so unanimous as this vote
would indicate.
Motions in both House and
Senate to defer the convention until January
17 failed by votes of 31 to 16 and 12 to 7, respectively.
The conservative vote in the Senate came from six
members of the “Opposition” into which the oldline Whig element had degenerated and one Democrat, while two of the “Opposition” voted with the
Democratic majority. In the House, seven Democrats voted with eight of the “Opposition” for delayed action, while one of the “Opposition” voted
with the radicals. A motion in the Senate to table
the bill failed without a record vote, while a resolution proposing popular ratification of the convention’s action was defeated, 12 to 4. If the vote
opposing precipitate action can be taken as a measure of anti-secession sentiment, conservatives constituted one-third of the legislature.
Before adjourning the legislature appropriated
$100,000 for the purchase of arms and munitions.
Perry left at once for South Carolina to arrange for
the purchase and to confer with secessionist leaders
from all over the South who had gathered to witness
the Palmetto State’s exit from the Union.
Governor Perry had designated December 22 as
the day for the election of members of the conven82

Fla. Senate Journ., 1860, 10-14.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol12/iss2/3

10

Dodd: The Secession Movement in Florida, 1850-1861, Part II

55
tion. In the short campaign that preceded the election the issue was immediate secession as against
cooperation, which meant delay until other southern
states, especially Alabama and Georgia, had acted.
General R. K. Call, a personal friend of Jackson
who had been thrown into the Whig camp by a quarrel with Van Buren, seems to have been the only
person to have voiced disaproval of secession under
any and all circumstances. In a pamphlet addressed
to the people he stated that secession was nothing
short of treason. The disunion movement in Florida
was not the result of Lincoln’s election, he said, but
the work of the state’s leading politicians, who had
long hated the Union. 83 The secession of South
Carolina came two days before the election and must
have contributed greatly in certain sections to the
success of the immediate secessionists. As the election returns are not available, results can only be
estimated. Judging from the way in which they cast
their votes in the convention, twenty-five of the sixtynine members were firm cooperationists and five
wavered between cooperation and immediate action.
On this basis, the cooperationists comprised from
36 to 43 per cent of the convention. If it could be
assumed that the vote on December 22 was as heavy
as that in the presidential election, an estimate
might be made of the shift of votes from radical to
conservative positions on the basis of counties which
gave Breckinridge majorities and yet sent cooperationist delegations to the convention. A minimum
shift of nine per cent is indicated, though the validity of the estimate is open to question.
While the radical movement in Florida was gaining a momentum that placed it beyond conservative
control, Hawkins in Washington was reflecting the
83

Cited in Davis, “Civil War and Reconstruction,” 50.
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opinion of the immediate secessionists. When he
was apointed to serve on the Committee of Thirtythree to consider federal relations he refused to
take part in its deliberations. Stating that he had
no confidence in congressional legislation as a means
of restoring harmony, he declared that the time for
compromise had passed. 84 A few days later he joined other southern members of Congress in a letter
to their constituents declaring that all hope of relief
for the South through constitutional action was exSpeedy secession of all slaveholding
hausted.
states and the formation of a southern confederacy
were recommended. 85
Neither Mallory nor Yulee signed the letter,
though a newspaper report said that Yulee would
do so. By this time Yulee seems to have accepted
unreservedly the idea of secession as an imminent
fact. What may have been in his mind is suggested
by a newspaper statement that he had announced
openly that Florida would secede for the purpose of
returning after obtaining new guarantees. 86 C. W.
Yulee says that his father’s memoranda show that
he had several possible results of secession in mind.
His real desire was that the South, by presenting a
united front, might bring the North to concede constitutional guarantees under which the Union might
be restored. Failing this, he thought of a defensive
and commercial league between the Union and the
new confederacy, in which the West and South might
84
Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 36-37. D. L. Dumond, in his
recent monograph, The Secession Movement, 1860-1861, 156-57,
shows that the Committee of Thirty-three was composed mainly
of Republicans opposed to conciliation who “converted it into a
graveyard for every proposal of compromise” introduced into the
House. Dumond intimates that Hawkins’refusal to serve was
due to the belief that the Republicans never would accede to
measures of conciliation.
85
N. Y. Herald, Dec. 14, 1860.
86
N. Y. Daily Tribune, Jan. 15, 1861.
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unite on the basis of their common interest in the
Mississippi river. 87 Whatever the springs of his
action might have been, his words and deeds thenceforth were those of a resolute secessionist.
Mallory’s failure to sign the letter must be attributed to an utter lack of sympathy with its tone
and purpose. There is little evidence as to his opinions and actions, but what there is indicates that he
was sincerely opposed to secession. He had been
able, in 1858, to look forward with equanimity to
Republican political control. He had said then that
if he thought such control would mean infringement
of southern rights, he would exert every effort of
which he was capable to induce the South to leave
the Union at once. It were folly for a man, when he
saw his doom ahead of him, to wait hour after hour
until the stern reality was upon him. The fate of
the Union, he had said, rested upon the constitutional action of the Republican party. 88 And the
implication was that he thought its actions would be
constitutional. Writing in 1865, he said that though
he had believed in secession as a right resulting from
state sovereignty, his conservatism made him regard
it as only another name for revolution.
He never
believed that there would be bloodshed and he expected compromise and conciliation even after the
secession of South Carolina. 89 His political associates during the trying days in December were such
sincere advocates of conciliation as Crittenden, Pugh
and Vallandigham. 90
It was not until January,
when the secession of Florida was only a matter of
hours, that Mallory was found cooperating with
87

Fla. Hist. Soc. Quart., II, No. 2, 3.
Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1138-40.
89
Mallory to Zachariah Chandler, July 2, 1865. 0. R., Series II,
Vol. VIII, 737.
90
N. Y. Herald, Dec. 24, 1860.
88
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those southern senators who desired secession or had
come to regard it as inevitable. He and Yulee took
part in a caucus of senators, January 5, 1861, in
which resolutions were adopted advising secession
of all southern states and formation of a southern
confederacy by action of a convention to meet in
Montgomery not later than February 15. The senators asked the states to instruct them if they should
remain in Congress until March 4 for the purpose
of defeating legislation hostile to the seceding
states. 91
Though hoping that secession could be effected
peaceably, the Florida senators acted with the possibility of war in mind. They sought, with some
degree of success, to ascertain the strength of the
garrisons and the amount of arms and munitions at
the several forts and arsenals in Florida and, on
January 5, Yulee wrote Joseph Finegan, a member
of the Florida convention, that the immediately important thing was occupation of the Florida forts. 92
Governor Perry had already arrived at the same
conclusion and obtained unofficial consent of the convention for such action at an informal conference,
January 4. 93 The arsenal at Chattahoochee and
Fort Marion at St. Augustine were seized by state
troops even before passage of the secession ordinance. 94 The Federals were in sufficient force at Pensacola to offer resistance, and the political situation
made unwise what military considerations would
have dictated. As Mallory wired Perry and Chase,
January 16, Davis did not think that the Pensacola
forts were worth one drop of blood under the circumstances then existing. 95
91

0. R., Series I, Vol. I, 443.
Ibid., 442.
93
Edmund Ruffin Diary, Jan. 4, 1861. Ms. in Library of Congress.
94
0. R., Series I, Vol. I, 332-33.
95
Ibid., Vol. LII, Pt. 2, 9.
92
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Pursuant to Governor Perry’s call the convention
had assembled January 3 in the state capital. The
little town was so thronged with politicians from
neighboring states as well as Florida that the two
hotels could not accommodate them, and the old Virginian fire-eater, Edmund Ruffin, was constrained to
accept the hospitality of Major John Beard. Ruffin
was an ardent secessionist who had come to Tallahassee for the pleasure of seeing Florida withdraw
from the Union and his diary reflects the hopes and
fears of the immediate secessionists. The election
had been close enough to make an immediate secessionist majority doubtful when the convention met.
But powerful factors were operating in favor of the
immediate secessionists. Out-of-state politicians,
including E. C. Bullock and L. W. Spratt, official
commissioners from Alabama and South Carolina
respectively to Florida, constituted a strong secession lobby. The churches seem to have favored
secession and the state administration was in the
hands of immediate secessionists. Organization of
the convention showed that they also controlled its
machinery.
John C. McGehee, of Madison county, a locality
settled largely by South Carolinians, was elected
president. McGehee was born in Abbeville, South
Carolina, in 1801, and moved to Florida thirty years
later. 96 A pious Christian as well as a large slaveholder, he was convinced of the moral righteousness
of slavery and this sentiment found expression in
radical political affiliations. In 1848, as a member
of the Democratic convention, he joined with W. L.
Yancy in insisting, unsuccessfully, upon incorporation of the doctrine of non-intervention into the platform. He accepted election as a delegate to the
96

Fla. Hist. Soc. Quart., IV, 186 ff.
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adjourned session of the Nashville convention in
November, 1850, and the next year was instrumental
in the organization of a Southern Rights Association in his county. In an address before that body,
June 7, 1851, he had declared the right of secession
to be “not only clear beyond the possibility of a
doubt but the duty absolute and unavoidable. 97 His
brief remarks in accepting the presidency of the convention showed that the passing years had not made
him more conservative.
Organization of the convention was not effected
until Saturday, January 5, the intervening day having been devoted to a day of fasting and humiliation
in compliance with a proclamation of President
Buchanan. This action greatly disgusted Ruffin,
who saw the proclamation as “a rebuke & censure
of the seceding states, & of their cause, & of the very
action which this Convention is assembled to consummate.“ 98 The service, which Ruffin refused to
attend, would have delighted him, for the rector of
St. John’s church preached a strong disunion sermon in favor of immediate secession. Francis H.
Rutledge, Episcopal bishop of Florida, absented
himself from the service for the same reason as
Ruffin. Rutledge, a South Carolinian by birth, held
that he had already seceded with his native state,
but he was so anxious for Florida to follow her that
on January 7 he transmitted to the convention a
promise to pay $500 to the State of Florida to be
used in defraying the expenses of government,
“‘whenever by ordinance she shall be declared an
independent republic.“ 99 These Episcopal ministers
were not alone among clergymen in their advocacy
97

Ibid., V., No. 2, 78.
Edmund Ruffin Diary, Jan. 3, 1861.
99
Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of the People of
Florida, 1861. Reprint, 1928. 22.
98
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of secession. The Florida Baptist state convention,
in session at Monticello during the latter part of
December, had adopted a resolution expressing
“their cordial sympathy with, and hearty approbation of those who are determined to maintain the
integrity of the Southern States, even by a disruption of all existing political ties.“ 100
McQueen McIntosh, of Apalachicola, who had resigned his federal judgeship upon the election of
Lincoln, on January 5 introduced a resolution declaring the constitutional right of secession and
stating that “in the opinion of this Convention, the
existing causes are such as to compel the State of
Florida to proceed to exercise that right.“ 101 The
resolution was adopted January 7 by a vote of 62 to
5 after an effort to insert an amendment delaying
the proposed action had been defeated 43 to 24. A
committee consisting of eight immediate secessionists and five cooperationists was thereupon appointed to prepare an ordinance for consideration by the
convention. Two days later the committee submitted a secession ordinance accompanied by a report
in favor of immediate secession. The cooperationists neither signed this report nor submitted one of
their own, but they did not consent to immediate
secession without a struggle. George T. Ward, of
Leon county, and Jackson Morton, of Santa Rosa
county, both former Whigs, led the opposition in an
effort to amend the ordinance to defer action until
after Georgia and Alabama had seceded and to require popular ratification of the measure. The first
proposal was defeated 39 to 30, while the second one
went down, 41 to 26. 102 When it was shown that immediate action could not be blocked, most of the co100
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operationists declared that they would vote for the
ordinance because they felt keenly the political
necessity for unanimity. 103 On January 10 the
ordinance was passed by a vote of 62 to 7.
Refusal of the secessionists to allow submission
of the ordinance to the people might be interpreted
as indicative of a belief that it would be rejected.
On the other hand, it could have meant that they
considered haste more imperative than compliance
with democratic forms. One Florida Unionist who
made his way north in January, 1861, declared emphatically that a majority of the people were not in
favor of immediate secession. 104 Another bit of evidence in support of this view was the action of G. W.
Parkhill, of Leon county, who, in deference to the
wishes of his constituents, offered a resolution to
require popular ratification and, his duty done,
thereafter voted with the immediate secessionists. 105
The delegation from Monroe and Dade counties, too,
though elected as cooperationists, 106 acted as often
with the immediate secessionists as with the conservatives. Though it cannot be said that a majority of the people was for cooperation, it is equally
open to question to assume that a majority was for
immediate secession.
Even if the exact proportion of cooperationists
could be determined, there would still remain the
question of exactly what they stood for. The counties in the West Florida panhandle, which is geographically a part of Alabama, were most keenly cooperationist. From this it could be argued simply
that they felt it inexpedient to act without the support of their neighbors. On the other hand, the
103
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cooperationist delegates came mainly from counties
which had been preponderantly Whig and conservative before the dissolution of that party. Both Ruffin and E. C. Bullock reported that no member of the
convention declared in favor of submission to the
Black Republicans. 107 That about half the cooperationists in that body were really opposed to secession in any form, however, is indicated by the vote
when the previous question was moved to bring to
a vote McIntosh’s resolution committing Florida to
secession. Thirteen delegates voted against the previous question.
Before passage of the ordinance the convention
had adopted a resolution instructing the Florida
members in Congress to remain there and to discharge all the duties of their offices until formally
notified that Florida had withdrawn from the Union.
Informal news of secession was not long in reaching
Washington and Yulee immediately acknowledged
“with pride” the full sovereignty of his state. 108 On
January 15 he and Mallory notified Governor Perry
that they had ceased to participate in the proceedings of the Senate and only awaited formal notification of Florida’s action to withdraw. 109 Their withdrawal took place on January 21.
Yulee spoke first. He dwelt first on the circumstances that had led Florida to recall the powers delegated to the federal government and to assume the
full exercise of all her sovereign rights. Then he
dealt with the fact that the State of Florida had been
formed from territory acquired by the United States
from Spain. One of the conditions of the cession of
107
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Spain, he said, was that the inhabitants of the territory should be admitted into the Union on terms of
equality with citizens of the United States. In pursuance of this stipulation and of the established
policy of the United States, the act admitting Florida had declared her to be a state and had admitted
her into the Union on a footing equal in all respects
with the original states. In seceding, Florida was
but exercising the equal rights thus granted and
acknowledged. He concluded his remarks by declaring his full approval of the act.
Mallory, too, insisted upon the full equality of
Florida within the Union. Speaking with greater
emotion than Yulee had, he made a moving plea for
peace. Yet he expressed much of the confidence,
even arrogance, that had brought the South to her
present pass, when he said, “We seek not to war
upon, or to conquer you ; and we know that you cannot conquer us. “ ll0
The two men who thus presented Florida’s valediction to the nation were playing their part in the
consummation of an event which neither, at heart,
had desired. Yulee, it is true, had helped sow the
germs of secession in 1850, but he had receded from
his original radical position and it is doubtful if he
ever completely returned to it. No man who really
desired secession would have supported Douglas in
1860. As regards his political theory, he was consistent throughout. He accepted the theory of state
sovereignty, as did his colleagues, with all its implications. This may have accounted for his readiness
after November, 1860, to go with the secessionists.
Mallory, too, believed in the theoretical right of
secession. He was probably more radical in 1850,
however, than ever again, and even in that year he
110
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was accounted a Unionist. Of the other members of
the Florida delegation in Congress between 1850
and 1860, E. C. Cabell was always a Unionist and
Jackson Morton, though he acted with the radicals
in 1850, helped lead the fight for delayed action in
the Florida convention in 1861. Only Maxwell and
Hawkins reflected in their speech and actions the
increase of radical sentiment at home. The pretext
for radical speech and thought in Florida was found
in the North, and frequently in Washington, but it
cannot be said that members of the state’s congressional delegation were responsible for the secession movement.
To locate the motivating force of that movement
one must turn rather to local politics. As early as
1852 the radical Democrats captured control of their
party, and dissolution of the Whig party, as a result
of the slavery controversy, gave the Democratic
party continuous control of the state administration.
The press, too, subsisting as it did largely on political patronage, became more and more radical, and
even the pulpit reflected the trend toward radicalism
of those in authority. Thus, when the crisis came,
the radicals controlled the machinery for action and
the means of propaganda. Added to this was the
fact that most of the conservatives felt that the
South had been deprived of her rights and believed
in the constitutional right of secession even though
they doubted its wisdom. Many of the most conservative men had long held that there was a point
beyond which secession was necessary. This belief
greatly weakened the force of their protest in 1861.
They were unfortunate, also, in their choice of cooperation as the basis of opposition to immediate
secession, for it was evident by the time the convention met that the secession movement, steered by a
well-organized, purposeful group of radicals, would
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sweep the other cotton states out of the Union.
Thus the conservative group, comprising certainly
a large minority and possibly a majority of the people, was helpless to avert the disaster which impended.
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